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Abstract: The reflections on civilization, barbarism, and their intricate relationship, 
which were put forward in ancient Greece, from Herodotus to Aristotle, had a long-
term impact. In the mid-16th century debate which took place in Valladolid, between 
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas, about the status of the native 
populations of the New World, the Latin translations of Aristotle’s Politics, and its 
comment by St. Thomas Aquinas, proved to be especially relevant for both opponents. 
Were Indian natives comparable to Aristotle’s “natural slaves”? Was the war against 
them comparable to hunting wild beasts? The paper focuses on the debate and its 
contemporary implications.
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Civilization, barbarism, and: does ‘and’ connect or disconnect? Does civilization stand 
in opposition to barbarism or must we consider that the relationship is altogether 
more complicated? And if so, why?
1. We are used to thinking that the opposition between civilization and barbarism 
came to us from the Greeks. But a reflection on its ambiguities is also part of the Greek 
legacy: its troubling implications still resonate with us.
Here is a story told by Herodotus, “the father of history” (a long debated, but 
well-earned title), in the third volume of his Histories (3, 38). It is a digression that 
is preceded by a detailed list of crimes committed by Cambyses, the Persian king: 
murder of his brother, incest with his sisters, violating cadavers, defiling the images of 
the gods. Cambyses, Herodotus concludes, was mad. An example follows:
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I hold it then in every way proved that Cambyses was very mad; else he would 
never have set himself to deride religion and custom. For if it were proposed to 
all nations to choose which seemed best of all customs, each, after examinations 
made, would place its own first; so well is each persuaded that its own are by far 
the best. It is not therefore to be supposed that any, save a madman, would turn 
such things to ridicule. I will give this one proof among many from which it may 
be inferred that all men hold this belief among their customs:  – When Darius 
was king, he summoned the Greeks who were with him and asked them what 
price would persuade them to eat their fathers’ dead bodies. They answered that 
there was no price for which they would do it. Then he summoned those Indians 
who are called Callatiae, who eat their parents, and asked them (the Greeks being 
present and understanding by interpretation what was said) what would make 
them willing to burn their fathers at death. The Indians cried aloud, that he should 
not speak of so horrid an act. So firmly rooted are these beliefs; and it is, I think, 
rightly said in Pindar’s poem that custom is the queen of all things. (Herodotus 
1982[ca 425 BC]: 51 [1, III])
That Darius, king of the Persians, actually attempted such an act appears to be highly 
unlikely; be that as it may, we will never succeed in reaching certainty on the matter. 
It is more important to understand the significance of his speech within Herodotus’ 
historical narration. Pindar’s formula, according to which “custom is the queen of all 
things” – nomos ho panton basileus – would lead us to conclude that all customs are 
equal, and therefore it is impossible to draw a clear boundary between customs which 
would be acceptable and those which would not (Nippel 1996; Humphreys 1987). In 
other words, our habits seem obvious and natural to us, insofar as they are, like all 
habits, the result of convention.
And yet, attributing to Herodotus a point of view which we would call radically 
relativistic, would be risky. It is worth remembering a remark by Arnaldo Momigliano: 
“Herodotus, one of the founding masters of ethnography, was ready to declare 
‘barbarian’ customs superior to the Hellenic ones. But it was a cool, ultimatedly self-
assured, look, at foreign civilizations. There was no temptation to yield to them” 
(Momigliano 1980: 518–519).
It is the cold look of someone who stages a mental experiment that addresses, 
on a small scale (but through an extreme example, namely funeral rites), a more 
general issue: the variety of human customs. On this point, Darius, the king of Persia, 
appears as a double, an alter ego of Herodotus, the Greek historian. They are both 
simultaneously the judge and the judged, inside and outside the experiment. When 
Herodotus says that custom is “the queen of all things” he simultaneously detaches 
himself from all things and observes them from afar. We see, looming in the distance, 
an ongoing dialogue between Herodotus and the sophists, who put forward paradoxes 
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like: “A Cretan says: all Cretans are liars.”28 Is the Cretan lying or is he telling the truth? 
What does Herodotus think?29
2. The paradox of the Cretan has never ceased to torment logicians: the paradox 
of Herodotus torments, or should torment, historians and anthropologists. But the 
unsettling feeling, which we feel in reading the aforementioned passage, that we 
are facing something contemporary, must be limited by pointing out an element of 
distance, which is linked to the term nomos. The translations of law or custom are 
inevitably inadequate, because the term nomos refers to an undifferentiated sphere in 
which ‘right’, ‘custom’ and ‘religion’ (in the sense in which we use these terms) mingle. 
Nomos is a noun derived from the verb nemein: divide (or allocate) according to the 
law or tradition (Benveniste 1948: 79, 1969: 85; Laroche 1949). We are seemingly back 
to our starting point, but after having acquired a piece of information: the association 
between law, custom, and division. Even when they look innocent, classifications 
(and especially dichotomous classifications) have often, although not always, political 
implications. In a famous passage from his dialogue The Statesman [Politikos], Plato 
introduces dichotomous categories into the discussion, aptly beginning with the one 
which contrasts Greeks and barbarians, through an objection which is formulated by 
one of the dialogue’s interlocutors, named, significantly, the Stranger:
[…] it is very much as if, in undertaking to divide the human race into two parts, 
one should make the division as most people in this country do; they separate the 
Hellenic race from all the rest as one, and to all other races, which are countless 
in number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give 
the single name ‘barbarian’; then, because of this single name, they think it is a 
single species. Or it was as if a man should think he was dividing number into two 
classes by cutting off a myriad from all the other numbers, with the notion that he 
was making one separate class, and then should give one name to all the rest, and 
because of that name should think that this also formed one class distinct from 
the other. A better division, more truly classified and more equal, would be made 
by dividing number into odd and even, and the human race into male and female; 
as for the Lydians and Phrygians and various others they could be opposed to the 
rest and split off from them when it was impossible to find and separate two parts, 
each of which formed a class. (Plato 1975[ca 350 BC]: 262d–263a)30
28 Nippel 1996: 174: “[…] there are discussions proposed by the sophists on the relativity 
of law (dissoi logoi) that refer to examples mentioned by Herodotus”. On dissoi logoi, see 
Untersteiner 1967: 161–172.
29 Here I pick up some remarks developed in Ginzburg 2006.
30 Cf. Lloyd 1966. A reference to this passage can be found also in Pagden 1986: 123–124.
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3. On this page Plato rejects the holistic opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between 
Greeks and barbarians, as poorly argued, and therefore untenable. The opposition, 
and its hierarchical implications, had been reinforced by the wars between the Greeks 
and Persians. Like Herodotus, although in a different manner, Plato responds to the 
challenge of the sophists. Today, this term immediately evokes the noun ‘sophistry’, 
with its negative connotations – an oblique and distant echo of the negative aura that 
surrounded the sophists, philosophers who roamed Greece, teaching eloquence. In 
return for their teaching, the sophists asked for payment: a novelty which created a 
scandal and cast an enduring shadow on their image. But the theories that the sophists 
proposed were scandalous as well, because they questioned allegedly self-evident ideas, 
such as the opposition of Greeks and barbarians – and more generally, the relationship 
between nomos and physis, law and habit on the one hand, nature on the other. “Could 
what we consider natural be on the contrary the product of convention?” argued the 
sophists. That is the question that Herodotus asked himself in staging the (presumably 
fictional) experiment staged by Darius, the Persian king.
Since a long time, historians of philosophy have dispelled the negative stereotypes 
that tradition had projected onto the sophists. Today, their questions seem more 
urgent than ever, even if our answers greatly differ from theirs. Certainly, we must be 
wary of false continuities, like those tied to language, as in the case of nomos/law/habit. 
And the Greek term physis, which we translate as ‘nature’, has a different meaning for 
us than it did for the ancient Greeks. Today, somebody could translate the opposition 
between physis and nomos, nature and convention, into a question rife with political 
implications: “Do cultural differences have a biological origin?” A translation that 
would amount to a blatant anachronism. Let us have a quick look at the historical 
sequence.
4. In his Statesman, Plato had opposed the natural dichotomy between men and 
women to the fictitious divide between Greeks and Barbarians. At the beginning of 
Politics, Aristotle cites the distinction between men and women, and the superiority of 
one over the other, to introduce by way of analogy the distinction between masters and 
slaves, i. e. between “natural ruler and natural subject [...]. One that can foresee with his 
mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and one that can do those things with his 
body is subject and naturally a slave”. For Aristotle, slavery is a natural phenomenon, 
like being a woman. Between these two forms of subordination, there exists yet 
another profound similarity: “among barbarians, the female and the slave have the 
same rank”, because barbarians “have no class of natural rulers”. The community that 
characterizes barbarian societies is a community of slaves. Aristotle cites approvingly 
a line from Euripides (Iphigenia in Aulis, line 1400): “’Tis meet that Greeks should rule 
barbarians” (Aristotle 1959[ca 325 BC]: 1252 a 26–1252 b 11).
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Today hardly anyone would claim that slavery is a natural phenomenon. Moreover, 
questions about the role played by cultural elements in the opposition between men 
and women have been around for a long time. But other statements within Aristotle’s 
vast oeuvre end up contradicting those which have been just mentioned.
Once again, we are confronted with an answer to the challenge posed by sophists. 
Their affirmations, deliberately provocative, about the relation between nomos 
(law/constitution) and physis (nature), claimed the human access to reality as self-
evident, like in the reference to Pindar’s words, “Custom is the queen of all things”. 
But Aristotle, in his Peri hermeneias [On Interpretation], focused on the language and 
the problematic relationship between language and meaning. Referring to a statement 
from Plato’s dialogue The Sophist, Aristotle observed that a noun taken alone and out 
of context can neither be true or false, “unless one adds that it is or is not, absolutely 
speaking (haplos) or referring to time (kata chronon)” (see Ginzburg 2001: 25–61). 
With this distinction, the issue addressed by the sophists – the distinction between 
physis (nature) and nomos (law/custom) – was tacitly shifted from the ontological to 
the epistemological level, from reality to discourse.31
On the surface, this argument looks purely technical; in fact, it amounted to a 
turning point in the history of thought, even if it was neither presented nor perceived 
as such for a long time. Looking back, it looks like a bomb that would end up exploding 
nearly two thousand years later. In his Latin translation of Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias, 
Boethius (who lived between the 5th and the 6th centuries CE) translated the 
distinction between haplos and katà chronon as simpliciter (absolutely) and secundum 
quid (according to the circumstances). The latter term expanded to a larger scale the 
general characterization indicated by Aristotle. 
Generation after generation of students read Aristotle’s On Interpretation in 
Boethius’ Latin translation (De interpretatione). Two of them would end up being 
the protagonists in the famous debate which took place in Valladolid, at the behest of 
Charles V, in 1550–1551: Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, translator of and commentator on 
Aristotle, and the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, bishop of Chiapas.
5. Sepúlveda and Las Casas were at odds on two issues: could one consider the Indians 
of the New World slaves by nature, and was a war against them a just war? These 
two questions presupposed a third: should one regard Indians as barbarians? On 
these questions (as well as on many others, more or less related to these), the two 
interlocutors took diametrically opposed positions: Sepúlveda argued for the Indians’ 
natural inferiority, whereas Las Casas fought for their rights, making a decisive 
contribution (as it is widely considered today) to the idea of human rights (see Baccelli 
31 Aristotle’s distinction may have been inspired by a passage of Dissoi logoi (5, 15), a sophist 
treatise; cf. Robinson 1979: 131, 208–9.
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2008). Still, Sepúlveda and Las Casas spoke a common tongue, made up of shared 
cultural references: not only Aristotle, but Aristotle read through St. Thomas Aquinas.
6. Thomas’ reading of Aristotle was an act of intellectual appropriation that had 
profound intellectual and political consequences. His commentary on the first 
chapter of the first book of Aristotle’s Politics, dealing with “barbarians”, was especially 
important. Thomas asked for a definition of ‘barbarian’, and then replied, quoting St. 
Paul (1 Cor. 14: 10–11):
However many the languages used in the world, all of them use sound; but if I do 
not understand the meaning of the sound, I am a barbarian to the person who is 
speaking, and the speaker is a barbarian to me. (The New Jerusalem Bible 1985)
One would be tempted to conclude, by removing this passage of Paul (who spoke 
Hebrew, Latin and Greek) from its context, that anyone may be a barbarian to others, 
regardless of who he is, as long as he does not understand the others’ language. It 
is difficult to imagine a more radical contestation of the idea of barbarism (and of 
natural barbarism) put forward by Aristotle. But Thomas did not stop there: the very 
interpretation of barbarism was debated. According to some, he wrote, barbarians are 
those who speak their language but do not know how to read or write: which is why 
the Venerable Bede translated the liberal arts into a vernacular language, to help the 
natives break free of their barbarism. Therefore, Thomas went on, by ‘barbarian’ one 
means ‘aliquid extraneum’, something foreign to us: the other. It seems as if Thomas is 
referring back to St. Paul, but instead it is Aristotle who is surfacing again: extraneus 
(other) can be meant as either simpliciter, absolutely, or quo ad aliquem, in relation to 
someone. From an absolute point of view, Thomas argued, we say that those who are 
strangers to the human race are such because they lack reason, “or because they live 
in a part of the world that is not temperate (propter regionem aliquam intemperatam)”, 
whose characteristics most often deprive inhabitants of intelligence, or because certain 
deficient customs one finds in certain lands render their inhabitants “irrational and 
nearly bestial (irrationales et quasi brutales)”. Men deprived of reason ignore both law 
and writing (Thomas Aquinas 1492[ca 1272]: c. 4v).
The emergence of a geographical dimension – as imprecise as it may be – within 
Thomas’ argumentation explains how Sepúlveda, in his Apologia, published in Rome 
in 1550, was able to cite the aforementioned page by Thomas in order to support 
his thesis, that war against the Indians was just (Sepúlveda 1975[1550]). Was it an 
unfounded reference? Certainly not, although Thomas could not foresee how his 
own reflections would be used almost three hundred years later, to justify the Spanish 
conquest of the New World.
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7. In the Apologia Sepúlveda took up the thesis of another Latin dialogue of his, the 
Democrates secundus, that had given rise to a series of such biting critiques that it 
was not granted a printing (Sepúlveda 2009[1544]). In turn, Bartolomé de Las Casas 
responded to Sepúlveda’s Apologia – a Spanish version of which he could have read – 
with a Latin Apologia, which also went unpublished (Las Casas 1975[1551]). It opens 
on a presentation of theses by Sepúlveda, followed by an impassioned and extremely 
detailed refutation, starting from those concerning barbarism.
Las Casas distinguished different uses of the term ‘barbarism’. According to 
the first, barbarism is synonymous with ferocity, and can therefore be applied to 
everyone and anyone, including (Las Casas observed contentiously) the Spanish, for 
the way in which they acted toward the Indios. According to the second meaning 
(continues Las Casas, following the commentary of St. Thomas on Aristotle’s Politics), 
barbarism refers to those who do not possess a written language. He who does not 
understand another’s language is a barbarian, as St. Paul says: it is in this sense that 
John Chrysostom may label the Three Wise Men as ‘barbarians’. And Las Casas 
(1975[1551]: c. 15r) commented:
These barbarians are not barbarians simpliciter, absolutely, but rather barbarians 
secundum quid: and therefore they are not to be spoken of as proper barbarians, 
but as barbarians due to a series of accidental circumstances, ex accidenti.32
Las Casas took up the distinction introduced by Aristotle in his Peri hermeneias, 
translated by Boethius and commented by Thomas. Recalling this Aristotelian origin 
is not irrelevant. To speak of a “traditional Thomist distinction”, as Anthony Pagden 
(1986: 126) did, would distort the meaning of the discussion between Sepúlveda and 
Las Casas.
Las Casas used the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid to distance 
himself from the Aristotelian Sepúlveda and his identification of the Indios with 
Aristotle’s barbarians as “slaves by nature”. “It is absolutely evident,” Las Casas 
observed, that the “barbarians by nature” mentioned in the first book of Politics have 
nothing to do with the barbarian monarchies (barbarorum regna) talked about in 
the third book: kingdoms resembling tyrannies and yet different, observes Aristotle, 
because they “govern according to law and are hereditary” (Aristotle 1959[ca 325BC]: 
249). But in the Latin Apologia of Las Casas, the passage from Aristotle is cited in 
a slightly different form: “legitimate and conforming to the mores of the country” 
32 “Huiusmodi barbari non simpliciter sed secundum quid barbari dicuntur: hoc est non sunt 
proprie barbari, sed ex accidenti [...]”. Cf. Aristotle 1959[ca 325 BC]: 1285 a.
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(“legitima et secundum morem patriae”).33 The motive is simple: Las Casas had read 
a Latin version of Politics translated by the humanist Leonardo Bruni, offered in 1438 
to Pope Eugen IV, and printed with Thomas’ commentary first in Rome, in 1492, then 
in Venice, in 1500 (Vasoli 1972: 629).34 Bruni (followed by Las Casas) misunderstood 
the meaning of the adjective patrikai in Aristotle’s passage (1285 a19), linking it to the 
‘fatherland’ (secundum morem patriae) rather than to the ‘hereditary’ transmission 
of the father to the son. Thomas, who had read and commented Aristotle’s Politics in 
the literal translation of William of Moerbeke, did not commit such a mistake. One 
can assume that Bruni’s mistranslation comes from another passage of Aristotle that 
Las Casas does not cite, in which these barbarian monarchies were identified as Asian 
monarchies:
[…] for because the barbarians are more servile in their nature (physei) than the 
Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic rule without 
any resentment. (Aristotle 1959[ca 325BC]: 249)
Las Casas argued – against Aristotle, who took the natural barbarism of Asian peoples 
as a given – that these “legitimate” monarchies (katà nomon), made possible by the 
“character naturally more servile” (physei) of Asian populations, were merely cases of 
barbarism secundum quid.35 In other words, Las Casas took advantage of a conceptual 
tool forged by Aristotle in order to distance himself from its creator, Aristotle, and his 
interpreter, Sepúlveda.36 
8. Starting from the passage about the barbarian monarchies we find in the third 
book of Aristotle’s Politics, Las Casas proposed a double analogy with the Indios of 
the New World. On the one hand, a negative analogy: the Indios are spared the stigma 
of absolute barbarism – barbarism simpliciter – to which Sepúlveda had condemned 
33 Las Casas 1975[1551]: c. 15v: “apud quosdam barbaros regna vim habentia proxima tyran-
nidi licet sint legitima et secundum morem patriae”. Pagden (1986: 132) translates this as: “legiti-
mate and paternal [in origin]”, going back to a passage of commentary by St. Th omas that Las 
Casas cited in his Apologia (but we fi nd no trace of this citation).
34 Th omas Aquinas, Commentaria… in octo Politicorum Aristotelis libros cum textus eiusdem. 
Interprete Leonardo Aretino, colophon: “impressum est hoc opus Romae per magistrum Eucha-
rium Silber alias Franck, xiiii kal. Aug. 1492”, c. 85 v. (I consulted the copy held at the Biblioteca 
Comunale degli Intronati in Siena, a-z8 A-I8).
35 Pagden (1986: 236, note 44) writes that William of Moerbeke, followed by Las Casas, would 
have been guilty of a “deliberate distortion of Aristotle’s text”; but Las Casas had read a diff erent 
translation.
36 Th omas Aquinas, Commentaria, c. 85 v: “secundum legem et secundum leges patrias. Dicunt 
autem leges patriae consuetudines, quae descendunt a parentibus in fi lios” (cf. Th omas Aquinas 
1951: 170).
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them. On the other hand, a positive analogy: like the barbarian monarchies described 
by Aristotle, the Indios have a “legitimate, just and natural principle” (Las Casas 
1975[1551]: c. 22r). The qualities that Las Casas famously recognized in these 
populations, namely their gentleness and their ease with the mechanical arts, were in 
a certain sense the corollary of their identification with a relative, “secundum quid” 
barbarism.
This looks like a decisive point, because it clarifies an apparent contradiction in 
Las Casas’ discourse. When we deal with the barbarians, he wrote, we must refrain 
from acts of repression, as the philosopher (that is, Aristotle) argues: we must coax 
them and lead them lovingly toward proper mores. Barbarians were also created in 
the image of God. Faced with human beings, whoever they may be – including those 
plunged in the most extreme barbarism – we must demonstrate Christian charity. 
Once again, Las Casas quoted St. Paul from memory, mixing up passages from the 
Epistle to the Romans (Rom. 1: 14–15), the Epistle to the Galatians (Gal. 3: 28–29) and 
the Epistle to the Colossians (Col. 3: 11):
I have an obligation to Greeks as well as barbarians, to the educated as well 
as the ignorant and hence the eagerness on my part to preach the gospel […] 
There can be […] neither male nor female […] there is no room for distinction 
between Greek and Jew, between the circumcised and uncircumcised, or between 
barbarian and Scythian, slave and free. There is only Christ: he is everything and 
he is in everything. (The New Jerusalem Bible 1985)
Here, Las Casas marked an unfathomable distance between Aristotle and himself:
Even if the philosopher, who knew neither of Christian charity nor the truth, 
wrote that knowledgeable people could hunt barbarians as one hunts wild beasts, 
nobody should think that it would be allowed to kill barbarians or treat them with 
harshness as if they were mares. (Las Casas (1975[1551]: c. 21r).
Las Casas is alluding to a passage from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. Sepúlveda 
had also cited it in his Democrates secundus, which Las Casas had been unable to read 
(Sepúlveda 2009[1544]: 35). A terrible passage, which must be cited in its entirety:
If therefore nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that 
nature has made all the animals for the sake of men. Hence even the art of war will 
by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of hunting is a part of it) 
that is properly employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind 
as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, inasmuch as 
this warfare is by nature just. (Aristotle 1959[ca 325 BC]: 1256 b 21–27)
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“Farewell, Aristotle (Valeat Aristoteles),” wrote Las Casas (1975[1551]: c. 21r). In the 
edition of Politics translated by Leonardo Bruni – which Las Casas had read – the 
passage which I just cited was accompanied by a commentary by St. Thomas. A few, 
laconic sentences:
Hunting is necessary amongst beasts that are naturally subject to man, as well as 
against barbarian men who are naturally slaves, as one has already stated; and if 
such a war ever takes place, it is a just war.37
St. Thomas commented on Aristotle; he did not judge him. Las Casas, a just and brave 
man, may have read these statements with horror. But he could have never written: 
“Farewell, St. Thomas.”
9. Between Greek ethnocentrism and Christian universalism there lies an abyss; but 
one must be wary of oversimplifications. Las Casas quoted the words of St. Paul – 
before Christ, there are neither slaves nor free men – and contrasted Christian charity 
with the harshness of Aristotle. But Thomas, not just a Christian, but a canonized 
saint, had not distanced himself from Aristotle, according to whom a war against 
slaves by nature, compared to wild beasts, is a just war. But hadn’t Las Casas learned 
from Aristotle himself that one could consider the Indios barbarians secundum quid, 
ruled by a power similar to tyranny, but nevertheless legitimate? These are historical, 
not logical, contradictions.
10. Two traditions (at least) superimposed in time and space. Aristotle’s Peri 
hermeneias, translated by Boethius, is an example of the way in which Greek and Latin 
traditions intertwined. But it is an extremely valuable example, since the distinction 
between simpliciter and secundum quid possesses a meta-linguistic value: it allows 
reflection on this intricate relationship from a distance. We may wonder whether other 
cultures have come up with a distinction analogous to this one. (To put it into practice 
in one’s daily life does not necessarily imply articulating it in explicit terms.)
37 Th omas Aquinas (1492[ca 1272]), Commentaria, c. 14r: “et pars eius est praedativa, qua 
oportet uti ad bestias que naturaliter sunt subiecte hominibus et ad homines barbaros qui sunt 
naturaliter servi, ut supradictum est; et si hoc bellum sit [,] iustum secundum naturam [est]”. 
Th is integration may refute the hypothesis advanced by Richard Tuck (1999: 71–72) according 
to which this version, which he quotes from the Venice edition of 1506, c. 9 (but the error 
“secundam Naturam” must be corrected), would be the result of an editorial intervention from 
the humanist era, modifying the original version: “Ac si hoc bellum primum sit iustum secundum 
naturam” (as in, for example, Egregii doctoris sancti Th ome de Aquino In libros polithicorum 
Ar[istotelis] comentum foeliciter incipit, Barcelona, 1478). Tuck refers, in a general manner, to 
Martin 1952, an essay which remains fundamental.
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As I argued elsewhere, Erich Auerbach, in his famous essay “Figura” (1938) re-
read the interpretation of the Scripture proposed by St. Augustine through Erwin 
Panofsky’s famous essay “Perspective as symbolic form” (Ginzburg 2013). Reading 
the Old Testament as a part of the New Testament, as St. Augustine proposed, meant 
emphasizing that the Hebrew Bible had been true in the past, but that its truth had 
been overtaken by Christian revelation. Therefore, in commenting on Augustine’s 
reading (which ended up, through Hegel, contributing to form our own attitude 
with regard to history), I myself proposed the metaphor of ‘perspective’ – even if 
the metaphors used by Augustine are musical, not visual (Ginzburg 2001: 155). This 
perspectivism implies a hierarchy, as in Christianity’s self-definition as Verus Israel. 
Could we broaden this conclusion to perspective understood at a literal level?
11. The answer to these questions leads us, once again, to the distinction articulated by 
Aristotle, translated by Boethius and commented by Thomas: the distinction between 
simpliciter and secundum quid. I cite it here in Latin, in Boethius’ translation, because 
that is what Las Casas did in several instances. He did it also in discussing a most 
delicate issue: human sacrifices practised by the Indios. Indeed, in commenting on 
this passage Tzvetan Todorov (1982: 195) spoke, with a certain embarrassment, of 
‘perspectivism’: “it is truly surprising to see ‘perspectivism’ introduced into a field so 
inappropriate for it”.
But let us look more closely at what Las Casas wrote. I will cite a brief excerpt 
from his response to objections addressed to him by Sepúlveda during the Valladolid 
debate:
As for what he [Sepúlveda] says about the probable opinion, etc., I say that when 
any population, whatever it may be, argues about the probable opinion, it does 
not do so with regard to the rules of simpliciter reason, but because it seems to the 
population that it is the way to go, and that the argument is used and approved 
by those who are experts in an activity or art, even if they end up being mistaken. 
(Las Casas 1992[1552]: 178)
In other words, Las Casas considers human sacrifices from a secundum quid 
perspective, which, however, presupposes an absolute perspective (simpliciter), 
founded on the rules of reason – and not on those of Christian religion.
12. This link between simpliciter and secundum quid is implicit in a text which was 
able to unfold in the most profound way the implications of the linear perspective as 
cognitive model, i. e. the dedicatory epistle which precedes Niccolò Machiavelli’s The 
Prince:
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Nor do I want it to be reputed presumption if a man from a low and mean state 
dares to discuss and give rules for the government of princes. For just as those 
who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the nature 
of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low places place 
themselves high atop mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one 
needs to be prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to be of the 
people. (Machiavelli 1998[1513]: 4)
Long time ago the words “sketch landscapes” were interpreted as an allusion to 
Leonardo da Vinci, whom Machiavelli had met in Imola, at the court of Cesare Borgia, 
in 1503. But Machiavelli had also definitely in mind Aristotle’s Politics, read (as Las 
Casas had done) in Leonardo Bruni’s Latin translation, commented by St. Thomas. 
Perspective, far from being egalitarian, is truly hierarchical, and allows us to grasp the 
“effectual truth of the thing” (verità effettuale della cosa) from a specific point of view. 
Machiavelli, one could say, integrated simpliciter and secundum quid (see Ginzburg 
2015).
13. But what about the barbarism of today? Massive migratory currents have been 
mixing human beings from different cultures. How should we face this diversity? One 
can imagine two opposing attitudes: to impose our point of view, or to tolerate all 
behaviours whatever they may be, even those the most removed from our own. Neither 
of these two solutions seems satisfactory; but a poorly sketched compromise between 
the two seems even less so. The only acceptable solution seems to be a secundum quid 
behaviour, on a case-by-case basis. Here, casuistry may prove to be helpful. Struck 
dead by Pascal’s Provinciales, casuistry (the Jesuits’, but others’ as well), came back to 
life in the context of bioethics.38 Bioethics teaches us that the Islamic veil and genital 
mutilation (to take two examples) cannot be placed on the same level. We must learn 
from the Jesuits, and from Pascal.39
38 I refl ected on these subjects in the Tanner Lectures I gave at Harvard in 2015 (Ginzburg in 
print).
39 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Maria Luisa Catoni and Sergio Landucci for 
their critical remarks, and Allen Boxer for his translation. A preliminary French version of 
this text was presented at the MuCEM de Marseille on March 13, 2014, as part of the cycle 
“Civilization and barbarism”, organised by Tzvetan Todorov, see http://en.calameo.com/
books/00235837689dd10169a80 (July 6, 2017).
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Цивилизация и варварство
Рассуждения о цивилизации, варварстве и их сложных взаимоотношениях, которые 
выдвигались в Древней Греции от Геродота до Аристотеля, возымели долгосрочные 
последствия. В дебатах о статусе коренных народов Нового Света, состоявшихся в 
Вальядолиде в середине 16 века между Хуаном Гинесом де Сепульведой и Бартоломе 
де Лас Касасом, особенно актуальными для обоих противников оказались латинские 
переводы «Политики» Аристотеля и комментарии к ней Фомы Аквинского. Были ли 
индейцы сопоставимы с «рабами по природе» Аристотеля? Была ли война против 
них сопоставимой с охотой на диких зверей? В статье основное внимание уделяется 
обсуждению дебатов и их современным последствиям. 
Tsivilisatsioon ja barbaarsus
Antiik-Kreekas Herodotosest Aristoteleseni välja pakutud mõtisklustel tsivilisatsioonist, 
barbaarsusest ja nende omavahelisest keerukast suhtest oli kaugeleulatuv mõju. 16. sajandi 
keskel Valladolidis Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda ja Bartolomé de Las Casase vahel aset leidnud 
debatis Uue Maailma põliselanikkonna staatuse üle osutusid mõlema vastase jaoks eriti 
oluliseks Aristotelese “Poliitika” tõlked ladina keelde ja Aquino Thomase kommentaar sellele. 
Kas indiaanlastest põliselanikke võis kõrvutada Aristotelese “loomupäraste orjadega”? Kas sõda 
nende vastu võis kõrvutada metsloomade küttimisega? Artiklis keskendutakse debatile ning 
selle kaasaegsetele implikatsioonidele. 
